Isis Has Given Iran and the US a Rare Opportunity For Detente

This article was last updated on April 16, 2022

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Few international relationships express the dominance of ideology over realism with such clarity as the cold war that has persisted between Iran and the United States over the past few decades. Time and again events conspire to reveal a convergence of interests; time and again ideology relentlessly pulls them apart. The “wall of mistrust”, first highlighted by the reformist President Khatami in 1998, has proved remarkably resistant to deconstruction. The crisis currently facing Iraq may yet prove serious enough to force a radical rethink in both Tehran and Washington, but history suggests that concerted political will from both sides will be required to translate a tactical coincidence of interests into a strategic detente.

We have, of course, been here before. The realisation after the tragedy of 9/11 that the perpetrators had been Sunni terrorists from Egypt and Saudi Arabia forced many American policymakers to pause for thought. Iran’s sympathetic and supportive response encouraged some to challenge their assumptions. With hitherto unprecedented Iranian support for the war in Afghanistan there was a palpable sense of detente in the air. There was even talk of a diplomatic revolution, with Iran and the US re-establishing ties and restoring a more constructive relationship.

Unfortunately, much to the satisfaction of Iranian hardliners who had never had much sympathy for President Khatami’s “dialogue of civilisations”, Bush opted for the comfort of the path well-trodden. Khatami’s policy of engagement was flatly rejected as Bush decried Iran as amember of the “axis of evil”, in a State of the Union speech that must rank among the most reckless in recent memory. Khatami, already under serious pressure from hardliners, found himself brutally cut adrift, with little to show for his presidency either at home or abroad. Bush’s fateful decision to seek a military solution in Iraq rather than a political solution with Iran reflected the strategic paucity of American hubris. Iranian hardliners rejoiced, Iranian grand bargains were rebuffed, ideology was triumphant, and Iranian domestic politics confidently strode along the neocon path it had set itself. As Khatami later lamented, Bush andMahmoud Ahmadinejad were cut from the same cloth.

Fast-forward a wasted decade later and we now face a similar situation. The wall of mistrust has been reinforced and if a crack appeared with the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013, the balance of power in Iran has shifted markedly over the past decade towards the hardline institutions, not least the supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Ayatollah Khamenei has little affection for the United States and he, as much as American policymakers, has been instrumental in limiting any current engagement to talks about Iran’s nuclear programme and the prospective lifting of sanctions – a position that has effectively been forced on him by the parlous state of the Iranian economy. There has been no desire, for instance, to extend the talks to include Syria, a country that many among the establishment consider to be the frontline in the global struggle against the US and where Iranian determination is seen as yielding results.

But there are also differences that may yet facilitate the political will that is required to transcend ideological dogma. In the first place, the rise of Isis in Iraq represents a failure of policy not only for the US but also for Iran. The “creative destruction” of 2003 undoubtedly set the scene, but the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is Iran’s man in Baghdad and there will be many in Tehran wondering how on earth he has mismanaged affairs so badly.

More pointedly, there will be others privately querying how the IRGC failed to see this coming, and the swift dispatch of “advisers” suggests that too much focus on Syria has led them to neglect their own backyard. Still, the prospect of IRGC coordination with the Americans offers the possibility that the mutual antipathy that exists with this key element in Iranian political calculations may soften. The tragedy for Iraq is that the situation may have to become more critical before each side is encouraged to move beyond its comfort zone and transform a tactical coincidence into a long overdue and mutually beneficial detente.

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