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I have always found Nadeem Farooq Paracha’s (known in Pakistan and elsewhere as NFP) writing interesting; both in his earlier incarnation as music critic and his current one as social and political commentator (on his Smoker’s Corner blog for Dawn). I don’t always agree with what he has to say. Nonetheless, I enjoy reading him. He is, almost always, witty (in a caustic way) and there is a lot to be said for the existence of at least one contrarian among Pakistan’s burgeoning multitude of English language commentators.
He does, however, occasionally go a little too far in his desire to impose a Marxist meta-narrative on Pakistan’s short history. Last weekend he wrote on his blog about the links between Pakistan’s urban, middle-class, trader (convoluted way of referring to an average businessperson) community and the forces of ‘radical Islam’.
“The urban trader class in Muslim countries — usually comprising middle-class urbanites — is a conservative section of society. In Pakistan too it has been one of the most willing recipients of faith-based socio-political trends and phenomena that began sweeping the country in the 1980s. It was the trader class — that included some industrialists, shopkeepers and both big and small businessmen — which was the first in line to support and then fund the political and social instruments that ran concentrated campaigns and drives to Islamise society and politics.”
This is an interesting set of claims. At first glance the first statement (in bold) appears not just plausible, but obvious, if thought of in the context of Pakistan. Take another look, though, and two problems emerge. First, is there a single community of urban, middle-class traders in Pakistan that any substantive set of socio-political views can be attributed to? Sure, they are all against the RGST. But are they all in favour of the Khilafat and Shariah law? I’m not so certain. Definitely not as certain as, Mr. Paracha.
Second, is it meaningful to say that ‘so and so section’ of Pakistani society is conservative? I can say the following: “The urban trader class in Pakistan is willing to pay bribes to get things done.” You might respond, sure that is true, but does that make middle-class business persons any different from anyone else? Most Pakistanis are willing to pay bribes to get things done and most Pakistanis are conservative.
Moving on, Mr. Paracha argues that this (particularly) conservative business community raced into the arms of Islamic radicals in the 1980′s, and that this was caused by the nationalization and stylized socialism of the previous decade. That they were pushed into financial support for conservative religious organizations by rampant statism, violation of property rights and economic instability.
Now I am no fan of nationalization (see here and here), but I’m not aware of the evidence he bases this claim on. Did a larger number of of middle-class urban Pakistanis start supporting religious organizations (financially) after the 1970′s? Is there verifiable evidence on charitable donations to these organizations from Pakistani business-folk spiking after the nationalizations of 1972 and 1974? I am sure that Mr. Paracha has stated, elsewhere, that funding from foreign sources for these organizations can explain their rise in influence in the 1980′s. In fact he does so in the 6th paragraph of the same article.
Let’s assume that he is right in his assertion that the ‘trader class’ actively supported radical Islamism as some sort of counterweight to the rise of socialism (the burden of proof lies on Mr. Paracha, but I concede I do not have access to the data on charitable donations to comprehensively debunk his thesis). What was their rationale? The business community, worried about their bottom line and economic instability, decided to throw their support behind hardline religious groups such as Sipah-i-Sahaba and Sunni Tehreek in order to … ummm. Go ahead, you try and complete that sentence. I suppose these traders from the early 80′s knew something about radical Islamists that I do not: their penchant for creating stable business environments and their respect for private property.
A more plausible assertion might be that religiously conservative people donate to and absorb the dogma of religiously conservative ideologues because they are prone to such indoctrination, regardless of their profession. It just so happens to be, that many owners of medium and small size businesses in Pakistan tend to be religiously conservative. Just like some Pakistani doctors, students and government employees, many of whom also donate to extremist groups.
I’m not saying there was no support for radical Islamic groups amongst businessmen in the 1980′s. I am stating (a) that this support was not isolated to the business community; (b) many in the business community were opposed to these groups; (c) whatever support came from businessmen, could not have been motivated by business interests, but was probably based on personal beliefs. I say, ‘probably’ because I haven’t conducted a survey of Pakistani businessmen from that period.
At the end of his article Mr. Paracha says:
“… many from this class (especially in Pakistan) have also been funding or backing extremist sectarian and radical Islamist organisations. It is their belief that the triumph of the isolationist mindset of these outfits would leave the trader classes’ economic interests dependant and profitable on factors within their own surroundings and away from international economic maneuvers and rules. It’s like a defeatist idea posing as a faith-driven winning force.”
It may be that many businessmen in Pakistan today, do donate money to extremist outfits. Some of them may also harbor some sort of delusional notions of an ‘Islamic economy’ broken asunder from the international economy. All the same, I have not seen evidence that a majority of Pakistani retailers, wholesalers and other small businessmen are unaware of the the international price of oil and how they’d like it to be lower, or the USD-PKR exchange rate, who do not stock foreign products in their inventory and who do not rely on conventional banks for working capital. If these people are simultaneously looking forward to an isolated Islamic economy then they are fluent in doublethink.
It may well be relevant to ask: why do some (whatever the number) Pakistani businessmen support radical Islamic organizations? Especially when it is clear that their business interests are harmed by these organizations. But to posit that Pakistan’s ‘trader class’ overwhelmingly supports Islamic radicals is overstating the facts, surely.
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